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Book Review
A Philosophy of Culture: The Scope of Holistic Pragmatism, by Morton White. Princeton University
Press, 2002, 193pp. Prologue, index. ISBN 0-691-12398-5.
As is appropriate for a philosophical work in the tradition of pragmatism, Morton White’s Philosophy of
Culture is both an argument and a demonstration: it does not merely state, but also makes a point. In
keeping with his self description as having the soul of an historian as well as the soul of a philosopher, it
is also a cogent genealogy of holistic pragmatism, anchored in William James and John Dewey but also
in White’s own philosophical pedigree. It differs from Cornel West’s assessment of Emerson as a proto-
pragmatist, but, like West, finds significant continuity in American philosophy beginning with Jonathan
Edwards and continuing through the New England transcendentalists to pragmatism.
One interesting dialogue it invites is between “prophetic” and “holistic” pragmatism--and between both
and analytic philosophy as it has taken root and become a dominant force in academic philosophy in the
United States. That force is evident in White’s work and especially in the running conversation he
maintains with W. V. Quine and Nelson Goodman. All three played significant roles in a pragmatic shift
among American analytic philosophers in the middle of the twentieth century. That shift did not divert
philosophical attention from language, and, in Quine, it did not divert attention from science and logic as
central to philosophical practice, even when the distinction between “analysis” and “synthesis” was
blurred. Quine, in fact, concluded that philosophy of science is philosophy enough. White, on the other
hand, seeing much in common between Goodman and Dewey, especially in their philosophies of art--and
between both and Quine--is drawn toward a broader field. He identifies science as one cultural institution
among many and pushes philosophy, guided by epistemology, toward study of the whole range of
institutions culture contains. In the end, he says, philosophy of culture may be philosophy enough.
Both the methodological monism evident in this turn and the depiction of culture as a container of
institutions are important to understanding what White is about. In this book, which ranges from religion
through art, natural science, and jurisprudence to ethics, the common strand is epistemological and
methodological. Diverse subject matters are joined by pragmatic methodology that is, as William James
suggested, radically empiricist. White’s survey of philosophical predecessors is partly guided by his
interest in exposing vestiges of rationalism. Such vestiges are invariably identified as weaknesses, and
correcting them is an integral part of White’s own philosophical project. But it is the consistency of
empirical/experimental approach that draws the diverse philosophical explorations together. As White
understands it, philosophical inquiry may be directed to a variety of institutions limited by nothing other
than the range of human cultural activity. White partly identifies the range as culture and includes not
only science but also religion, art, jurisprudence, and ethics under its umbrella.
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In this regard, it is interesting that White distinguishes his definition of culture from that employed by
“some anthropologists.” Unfortunately, he doesn’t indicate which anthropologists he has in mind; but at
least part of what he does with culture has much in common with the work of anthropologists such as
Clifford Geertz, for whom culture is a human activity carried on across a range as broad as the one
explored by White (from “common sense” through religion, language, art, and science). It is worth
pausing over what is effectively a bi-level definition of culture. On the one hand, as already mentioned, it
is a container of institutions which are themselves social structures within which human activity occurs.
While the actual range of institutions examined in this book is limited (the book, after all, is limited to a
finite space and therefore cannot have infinite range), the logic of White’s argument (and Geertz’s as
well) suggests that the potential variety is not. Societies can divide and group human activities in a
dizzying variety of ways, and every such division and grouping is potentially an “institution” subject to
philosophical investigation. Science as an institution is one of many, and there is no reason to privilege it
over others.
To make this point, White spends considerable time demonstrating that James was doing much the same
thing when he studied religion that Quine was doing when he studied natural science--and that Dewey or
Goodman were doing when they studied art. But that draws attention to the other hand, which is the
doing more than the containing. Certainly one strand of anthropological inquiry (most often associated
with Geertz’s thick description, which he borrowed from Gilbert Ryle by way of Paul Ricoeur)
approaches “culture” pragmatically, centering on action. Culture is what human beings do. That what we
do is create and that what we create is an array of structures by which to organize and occupy the world
(in the process of organizing and occupying it) is hardly surprising to philosophers steeped in the
psychology of William James. But this is singularly important to White, and it is critically important to
pragmatism as a philosophical enterprise--to the point of rendering “holistic pragmatism” (and perhaps
also “prophetic pragmatism”) redundant.
The pragmatist is engaged in culture, and that engagement can never be the engagement of a detached
observer. Human inquiry into culture is a cultural activity, and every cultural activity both participates in
and transforms culture. White’s argument, which draws heavily on Duhem, is that this participation and
transformation is a transformation of the whole. All the parts are interconnected, so changing one
changes all. This brings to mind another anthropologist, Gregory Bateson, and his attention to systems
theory (which has, in turn, been particularly attentive to Peirce). The interconnectedness of systems
results in a certain circularity. Knowing is an action in which a subject engages, and action changes the
object of the subject’s knowing. Hence White’s emphasis on epistemology--and his description of a
pragmatic epistemology that is empirical and experimental. There is not an “essence” to be apprehended
or by which to judge the adequacy of knowledge. There is a world in which to be engaged, and the
engagement may be tested experimentally. This leads in White (as in other pragmatists) to an equation of
“truth” with “utility” that can be misleading if one simply assumes that the meaning of “utility” is self-
evident. Utility, understood in the context of a pragmatic epistemology, is experimental, and it points to
the provisional, circular, and active character of knowledge. White’s empiricism (like that of James and
Dewey) asserts a necessary connection between knowledge and experience--and this leads to a
confrontation with strictly analytic philosophy (because it suggests that strictly analytic is not possible,
since the distinction between synthetic and analytic is not strict).
That last point is what leads to one of White’s most interesting moves, the suggestion that a number of
important analytic philosophers in the American tradition (Goodman, Quine, and Tarski, for example)
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“matured” out of merely analytic philosophy into something more closely resembling pragmatism.
Coupled with this suggestion is the equally interesting one that even Bertrand Russell inclined to holistic
pragmatism when he was most consistently anti-rationalist. This makes for an important argument about
empiricism, which has often been associated with positivism. For White (as for James before him), the
most radically empiricist approach is not positivist at all--certainly not narrowly positivist.
White’s resistance to every attempt to narrow the field of philosophical inquiry is characteristic of
American philosophy in the pragmatist tradition, which took root outside academic philosophy and has,
at times, continued to thrive there. While White identifies thoroughly academic roots in his prologue, he
bridges two schools and takes up pragmatism’s eclectic range of subject matters. Formally, this leads him
to reject the traditional understanding of “science” as a body of knowledge. The rejection (again,
characteristic of pragmatism) collapses art (traditionally understood as a method) and science, shifting
attention from the subject matter to the practice of knowing. For White, this begins early in the
simultaneous influence of Dewey and G.E. Moore. Moore argued that the philosopher should arrive at
truths that are analytic and not dependent on experience. But White, along with Nelson Goodman (who
begins under the influence of C.I. Lewis) and W.V. Quine (who begins under the influence of Rudolph
Carnap), “came to think that the philosopher’s task is an empirical enterprise requiring an examination of
how we do and should use language rather than an effort to decompose concepts” (ix). While
acknowledging the influence of one of the most important figures in Anglo-American analytic
philosophy, White understands his own philosophical development as undercutting the foundation of that
philosophical approach. And the development depends on the other early influence, Dewey, with which
he begins. White credits his study of Dewey and Holmes as turning him toward cultural history,
epistemically uniting the historian and the philosopher in him. “Epistemically” is the key, because, while
expanding the field of philosophical inquiry, White narrows its methodology, drawing on the
epistemological gradualism of Dewey and the epistemological holism of Tarski. For White. “Moorian
analysis of concepts” appeared to be “a remnant of classical rationalism from whose influence even
James and Dewey did not wholly escape” (x). But, because they partly escaped, they pointed the way for
White, who gradually shed the vestiges of rationalism and came to see “that Dewey was right to claim
that much of the history of philosophy had been a fruitless quest for certainty” (xi). Under the influence
of Moore, White focuses on language; but, under the influence of Dewey, he shifts his attention from
concepts to the practice of language. He proceeds in conversation with Quine, Goodman, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, and John Rawls; and he does it with the soul of an historian as well as the soul of a philosopher.
What this means is that the quest for a fixed body of knowledge corresponding to the “essence” of truth
is abandoned in favor of an ongoing philosophical practice--in traditional terms, an “art,” not a
“science.” But, in the best tradition of pragmatism, White is convinced that science itself is a practice,
not a body or bodies of knowledge. Truth has more to do with methodology than content. And this leads
to methodological monism (19ff) that draws its unity from the practitioner as well as the practice: “a
whole thinker subjects a heterogeneous stock of opinions to a test in which logical consistency, and
conformity to both experience and desire, is to be taken into account” (22). Taking both experience and
desire into account along with logical consistency and the practice of a unifying subject results in “a
methodological monism that applies to logic, physics, ethics, and esthetics” (44).
White locates the roots of holistic pragmatism in the “regularity” theory of Hume and Mill taken up by
Hempel and Popper in the twentieth century (77). But these roots are traced through Dewey and (perhaps
surprisingly) Hegel (25) as well as Wittgenstein--particularly his understanding of language as “a form of
life” (62). The single most important name in White’s genealogy of holistic pragmatism, though, is
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Duhem. It is Duhem who points him to wholeness as a criterion in historical study; and Duhem also
plays an important role in alerting him to the significance of interest across the boundary between
chronicle and history (92). Neither chronicle nor history is detached from the interest of the historian, and
neither is isolated from the whole. While no single account, chronicle or history, can encompass the
whole, any legitimate account will be conscious of its connection to both. This enables White to criticize
accounts that exclude or deny events in the service of particular ideologies without implying that there is
some sort of objective account detached from the interest of the historian to be judged by an equally
detached picture of truth. In his philosophical account of history as in his survey of philosophical
accounts of cultural institutions, White looks for unity in the inquiring subject and her or his
methodology . This is evident in his discussion of the historian’s practice, but it is also evident in the
approval with which he cites Goodman’s turn from “What is art? to “When is art?” The shift from
“what” to “when” is a shift from “substance” (or the illusion of substance) to the practicing subject, and
that is critical to pragmatism as White understands it.
White’s expansive assessment of the field hangs together because of his consistent epistemological focus,
a focus that keeps leading him back to a practicing subject. Art is what artists do. Science is what
scientists do. Philosophy is what philosophers do. And culture is what humans do. Near the beginning,
White asserts that “cultural philosophy or philosophy of culture is more inclusive than philosophy of
science because the latter is a study of only one cultural institution and therefore coordinate with the
studies of other institutions that make up a culture or a civilization” (xiii). By the end, a whole series of
those coordinate studies have been brought to our attention; and what ties them together is the human
practice common to all--rule-governed practice the regularities of which lend themselves to systematic
reflection even as they defy containment in the kind of system with which rationalism (at its most
extreme in Hegel) has been obsessed. Systematic reflection on those regularities, ranging across the
whole field of human activity, is philosophy of culture, an evolving practice in which reflection and
experience are reciprocally related. And that, open-ended and unfinished as it is, may indeed be, as White
suggests, philosophy enough.
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